Case study · MNRE · National Green Hydrogen Mission

Certifying green hydrogen for the whole country, from a blank page

India had no process for certifying green hydrogen. The process was defined with the ministry first, then the portal was built around it, security-audited, and launched by the Minister on 1 July 2026.

Client
Ministry of New and Renewable EnergyDelivered through NeGD, MeitY
Role
Project ManagerBDO India
Team
10 peopleBusiness analysts, developers, QA, design, DevOps
Timeline
Jan to Jul 2026Public launch on 1 July 2026
5M tonnesa year: India's green hydrogen target for 2030. This is the national certification portal for it.National Green Hydrogen Mission
~₹7 croreproject value, launched by the Minister on 1 July 2026
8certificates issued so far, from 20+ applications
48 of 51security findings fixed before the external audit

The challenge

India aims to produce 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen a year by 2030. For hydrogen to count as green, it must be made from renewable energy and stay under a set carbon limit, and someone has to check and certify that. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy issued the scheme rules in April 2025. What did not exist was a way to apply, audit, approve and issue certificates online.

There was no existing process to copy, so the process had to be defined before anything could be built. The launch date was fixed, the cloud environment arrived only two and a half weeks before the first testing target, and an external security audit stood between the build and going live.

What was done

1. Define the process with the ministry first.

The team started from the scheme rules, mapped every user journey, studied similar portals and presented the process flow to the client. Nothing went to development until the client accepted it. The requirements, about 250 features across 11 modules, were signed off before the first sprint, and every later change went through a formal change request.

2. Never overwrite a certificate.

A certificate is a legal record. When one is amended, the system keeps the original and adds a new version, for all four certificate types. It costs more storage and makes the screens more complex. It means the full history can be shown years later if anyone challenges a certification.

3. Test security before the auditors arrive.

The team reviewed its own code first and closed 48 of 51 findings before the external audit by a CERT-In empanelled agency began. The audit then needed one short round of fixes, and clearance came on 30 June, the day before launch.

4. Launch without AI, and add it later.

The people who verify and approve certificates had never used this digital process. They needed to understand it first, so Phase 1 launched with no AI. It was planned for Phase 2.

My role

What I owned

The process definition and requirements baseline, the change-control routine, delivery governance and escalation, the UAT and security-remediation plan, and the Phase 2 scope and request for quotation.

What the team delivered

Design, build and testing of 11 modules, and the fixes that came out of the security review. A team of ten, including me.

What the client decided

The scheme rules, sign-off of the baseline and of each change, acceptance after UAT, security clearance, and the decision to launch.

The result

The Minister launched the portal on 1 July 2026. 8 producers, 3 verification agencies and 4 committee members are on it. More than 20 applications have come in and 8 certificates have been issued so far. Signing with Aadhaar eSign and a digital signature certificate, notifications and the document locker all work.

After launch, the first change request touched the workflow itself. It was analysed, approved by the client and ready in about three days.

Where AI fits

Phase 2 · approved, in procurement

Phase 2 adds AI to help check submissions, spot unusual emissions data and support verifiers. Two rules apply. AI advises, and a named officer approves every important decision. Every claim it makes must point to the document behind it. It will be accepted against cases that people have already answered by hand.

The lesson

When a process is new, the people who must judge the result have to understand it first. Holding AI back by one phase means Phase 2 can be accepted on evidence.

When a project has to define its own process, the time spent agreeing it with the client before development is what makes the launch date possible.

In figures
JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAug Mandate. Process defined.BRD signed before sprint 1Build startstwo-week sprintsUAT release66 fixes closedSecurity review48 of 51 closedAudit passedcertificate 30 JunePhase 2 scopefinalised
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Process first, then build. The scheme had no mature digital process, so the process was defined and signed in January before the build started. Launch followed in mid-2026.
View the numbers as a table
When (2026)What
JanMandate received; process defined; BRD signed before sprint 1
FebBuild starts
27 MarUAT release; 66 fixes and enhancements closed before submission
MayInternal security review: 48 of 51 findings closed
30 JunExternal audit passed; certificate issued
AugPhase 2 AI scope finalised
ConceptP-1FacilityP-2ProvisionalP-3FinalP-4 Version 3latestVersion 3latest Amended for expansion,ownership transfer ora new unit An amendment is a newversion. The originalstays intact. Issued automaticallyat or below 2.0 kgCO2e per kg H2 Payment-gated.Acts as the Guaranteeof Origin. Issued certificates and the audit log sit in write-once storage
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A certificate is a legal artefact, so an amendment never overwrites. Every change becomes a new record and the original stays readable. The cost is storage and a harder interface, which has to say which version you are looking at.
View the numbers as a table
CertificateRule
Concept (P-1)Amendments create a new version
Facility (P-2)Amendments create a new version
Provisional (P-3)Issued automatically at or below 2.0 kg CO2e per kg H2
Final (P-4)Payment-gated; acts as the Guarantee of Origin
Read the detailsTimeline, requirements, rules, decisions, architecture, testing, change control and the Phase 2 plan
01 · Situation

There was no as-is process to digitise

The Green Hydrogen Certification of India scheme sits under the National Green Hydrogen Mission at MNRE, and its rules were issued as an Office Memorandum on 29 April 2025. India had no established digital certification process for green hydrogen of this kind, so there was no mature process to take and automate.

The scheme certifies hydrogen in four stages: a Concept Certificate, a Facility Certificate, a Provisional Certificate and a Final Certificate. Producers apply, accredited verifiers (ACVs) audit, and a Technical Committee (TC) decides. A Super Admin and the ministry run the registry, and anyone can verify a certificate without logging in.

Process definition, product design, delivery, stakeholder coordination, security testing and the later AI design all had to happen together rather than in sequence.

02 · The constraint

Define it, build it and pass the audit, all at once

  • No existing certification process, and so no benchmark to build against
  • Four certificate types, each needing an auditable record of every amendment
  • A fixed public launch, with the cloud environment arriving only two and a half weeks before the first UAT target
  • An external security audit by a CERT-In empanelled auditor standing between the build and production
  • Validation rules that change through office memoranda, not through releases
  • Verifiers and committee members who had never operated the digital process they were about to be measured on
03 · My mandate

From process definition to a Phase 2 AI scope

I started on the programme in January 2026 as Project Manager, leading a team of ten that included two business analysts, three full-stack developers, a tech lead, QA, UI/UX and DevOps. I owned delivery from process definition through production, ran the client relationship and change control, and wrote the scope for the Phase 2 AI layer.

The reports I wrote kept my own decisions and coordination separate from what the team built. This page does the same.

04 · Timeline

January to a public launch on 1 July

JanFebMarAprMayJunJul MandateBRD v1.0 submittedMid-March13 Mar: cloud environment ready19 Mar: client meeting, 40 field changesPre-login to UAT2 AprUAT round 110 MayUAT round 29 Jun, client venueSecurity fixes19 to 22 Jun, 3 daysPublic launch1 Jul, by the Minister
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Dependencies set the dates, not the build. The cloud environment arrived on 13 March against a 31 March UAT target. The plan was re-cut with the real dates and UAT was released in phases. The 1 July launch held.
View the numbers as a table
Date (2026)Event
JanMandate received; BRD v1.0 submitted
13 MarCloud environment ready
19 MarClient meeting chaired by the client CTO; 40 field changes decided; blockchain moved out of Phase 1
2 AprPre-login site submitted for UAT; certificate flows followed in phases
10 MayUAT round 1
9 JunUAT round 2 workshop with producers, ACV agencies and the Technical Committee
19 to 22 JunExternal security reports received and every finding fixed
1 JulPublic launch, announced by the Minister

Between the milestones, the build ran as two-week sprints, about nine of them, with a demo every three. Sprint two built the database schema and registration. Sprint three built the Concept and Facility flows. Sprint four built the Provisional and Final flows, the rules engine and the UAT preparation.

05 · How it was run

Defining a process that did not exist

The scheme was the starting document. Each step below fed the next, and nothing went to development until the process flow had been presented to and accepted by the client.

  1. Scheme as guidelinewhat must be done
  2. User journeysstakeholders and users
  3. Rules and processesmapped from the journeys
  4. Benchmarkingacross similar portals
  5. Gap analysisno gaps left open
  6. Process flowpresented to the client
  7. Developmentthen built
Team and cadence

Ten people, including me. A daily stand-up, a weekly blocker review, a Director-level review at each milestone, and a monthly progress report on the client's template. Tasks were tracked in OpenForge, an internal NIC tool.

Escalation

Team to tech lead, to me, to the programme Director, and from there to the client's programme director. Formal letters went at Director level, and approvals ran through the government file system.

06 · Requirements

A signed baseline, and a controlled way to change it

The business analysts prepared the BRD. I reviewed it and presented it in the regular client connects, and the client Director signed it before sprint one. Nothing in it changed after sign-off. Later changes went in as change requests, recorded in an annexure to the BRD.

ArtefactWhat it held
BRD v1.0 to v2.0Submitted in January; v2.0 shared on 22 April, with the technology references corrected
SRSAbout 250 features across 11 modules, traced through a requirements traceability matrix from requirement to function to feature
Field mapping14 sheets mapping fields to each certificate type and each stakeholder
Validation rules124 rules: 37 for Concept, 40 for Facility, 20 for Provisional and 27 for Final, with 163 mapped to API endpoints
Notification matrix42 triggers across email and SMS
Field change tracker40 changes from the 19 March client meeting: 15 at the highest priority, 21 at the next and 4 at the lowest
Verifier checklistsCut from long to brief: 8 items for Concept, 12 for Facility and 12 for Final
Records of discussionAfter each substantive client meeting: seven decision sections and 14 actions from 19 March alone
FAQs and manuals74 FAQs across four audiences, and user manuals for producers, verifiers, committee members and super admins

Requirements came from the scheme text, the client's own field lists, a round of comments from three industry organisations (53 comments in all) and the 19 March meeting chaired by the client CTO. That meeting moved blockchain out of Phase 1.

07 · Workflow and rules

The scheme, enforced by the system

The platform has 11 modules, among them authentication and role-based access, the application forms, the workflow engine, ACV and TC review, the certificate registry, public verification, notifications, administration and an immutable audit trail. The workflow is a state machine, and every move has a named actor.

DraftPRODUCERSubmittedPRODUCERACV reviewACVACV reportACVTC reviewTCApprovedTCCertifiedSYSTEM Provisional certificate: issued automatically at or below 2.0 kg CO2e per kg H2, no review Clarification requestedproducer responds, then the review resumes Final certificate with a carbonintensity above 2.0: rejected, andevery provisional withdrawn at once
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The system enforces the scheme, so no officer has to remember it. A rejection, a clarification and a withdrawal are all states with a named actor, and every move is written to the audit log.
View the numbers as a table
StateMoved byNext
DraftProducerSubmitted or withdrawn
SubmittedProducerACV review; provisional certificates are issued automatically
ACV reviewVerification agency (ACV)ACV report, or clarification requested
ACV reportACVTC review
TC reviewTechnical CommitteeApproved, rejected or clarification requested
RejectedTechnical CommitteeA second ACV is appointed; its decision is final
ApprovedTechnical CommitteeCertified once a valid signature is applied
CertifiedSystemActive, or withdrawn with a reason and a timestamp

Rules settled, and the reason for each

RuleWhy
A Provisional Certificate is issued automatically, in the same transaction as the submission, with no verifier or committee involvedThe scheme says so, and a review step would contradict it
When a Final Certificate's carbon intensity exceeds 2.0 kg CO2e per kg H2, every Provisional Certificate for that facility is withdrawn in one transactionPartial withdrawal would leave the registry in a state the scheme does not allow
A fee applies to the Final Certificate only, calculated per 100 kg of hydrogenThe scheme sets no fee for the earlier certificates and provides no refund
Every form carries two signature options, Aadhaar eSign and a DSC, and a certificate is generated only after a valid signatureNon-repudiation
A facility with the same boundary and meter becomes a new version of the same Facility Certificate; anything else is a new certificatePhases of one project must not block each other
After a rejection, the Technical Committee appoints a second verifier, and its decision is finalThe scheme provides for exactly one second opinion
Verifier and committee accounts are approved by the implementing agency before they can actA control before anyone touches the workflow
Verifiers and producers communicate through defined threads; there is no direct thread between committee and producerA team decision, taken on 7 March, to keep every question on the record
08 · Decisions

Three calls, each with its cost

Decision 1. Keep every certificate version; never overwrite one.

WhyA certificate is a legal artefact. If an amendment overwrites the original, the evidence of how the decision was reached is destroyed. So an amendment becomes a new record while the original stays intact, across all four certificate types. Concept and Facility certificates, for example, can be amended for an expansion, an ownership transfer or a new unit.

Trade-off acceptedAppend-only costs storage, makes every read path more complex, and means the interface has to explain which version a user is looking at. It buys a trail that survives a challenge to a certification years later.

Decision 2. Run an internal security review before the external audit.

WhyIf the external audit is the moment issues surface, the production date sits at the mercy of a report. The programme reviewed the code internally and fixed things in parallel, so the external audit met a platform that had already been attacked.

Trade-off acceptedIt pulled security effort forward into a window already competing with feature delivery, and some of that effort would have been unnecessary had the audit been lenient. It produced a short fix-and-revalidate round instead of a long remediation cycle.

Decision 3. Keep AI out of Phase 1, deliberately.

WhyAuditors needed to understand and operate the underlying process before they could judge an assistant working on top of it. An AI suggestion that nobody can evaluate is one nobody should trust. The decision was taken with the client on 19 March.

Trade-off acceptedIt delayed the efficiency gain by a full phase and meant launching with manual effort we knew could be reduced. It meant Phase 2 could be accepted on evidence rather than on faith.

Other decisions on the record

DecisionChoiceWhat it cost
Who certifiesThe Technical Committee only, not the implementing agencyLess agency control, and a cleaner line of accountability
Phase 1 scopeNo AI and no blockchain; both moved to Phase 2Less to show at launch
Account onboardingImplementing-agency approval for verifier and committee accountsMore administrator work
Verifier checklistsShort lists, not exhaustive onesLess detail on the page, more judgement for the verifier
Merging codePull requests only, from 3 June, with peer reviewSlower merges, and no change reaching production unreviewed
During external security testingA code freeze while findings were fixedFeature work waited
UATTwo rounds, with the environment reset to a clean state before the secondTime spent on resets
Phase 2 procurementOne open-ended request for quotation, no technology prescribed, single cover under GFR 2017Bidders gain freedom, and the evaluation has to work harder
09 · Architecture

How the system is put together

The platform runs as four deployable services behind a single load balancer: the front end, an authentication service, a user and application service, and an admin and workflow service. They share a versioned internal library. Behind them sit PostgreSQL, Redis for sessions and caching, a message broker for notifications, and object storage for documents and certificates.

USERS ProducersCertification bodiesVerification agenciesMinistry officers Reactfront endSix roles, eachfailing closed Node.jsAPI servicesWorkflow, payments,certificates, audit PostgreSQLRedis · RabbitMQ Write-oncecertificates, logs Integrations: Entity Locker sign-in,C-DAC eSign, Bhashini translation Hosted on AWS, Mumbai regionOpen-source stack throughout
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A schematic, not a screenshot. It shows the shape of the system and nothing from the live environment. Tool and infrastructure detail beyond this stays out on purpose.

Traffic passes a web application firewall with managed rule sets, and secrets and encryption keys sit in a managed vault. There were four environments (development, QA, UAT and production). Every change reached them through the same pipeline: a pull request, peer review, a CI build with a static-analysis quality gate, then a signed-off release.

  1. Pull requestpeer review
  2. CI buildquality gate
  3. Image registryversioned
  4. Sign-offeight roles
  5. Release8 to 11 pm window
  6. Smoke testthen rollback ready

The release window was 8 to 11 pm, after a database backup, with a rollback plan sized at 45 to 60 minutes. Eight roles signed each deployment: development, QA, security, DevOps and four others.

10 · Testing and security

Two rounds of user testing, and one external security audit

UAT ran in two rounds. Round one began on 10 May with test accounts for producers and verifiers. Round two was a workshop at the client venue on 9 June with producers, ACV agencies and the Technical Committee. The environment was reset to a clean state before it, and every P0 and P1 defect was closed before the workshop began. In all, 262 defects were logged through UAT, and by the June review only a handful of low-severity or deferred items remained open.

48/51 CLOSED 48 closed before the external audit openedfindings from the internal security review 3 verified by hand, with the residual risk signedaccepted with an owner, not carried quietly External audit: one short fix-and-revalidate roundcertificate issued 30 June 2026
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Security as a delivery stream, not a gate at the end. The external audit met a platform that had already been attacked. The accepted risk has an owner; that is what separates an accepted risk from an unowned one.
View the numbers as a table
ItemCount
Closed before external audit48
Manually verified, risk signed3
Total internal findings51

Security ran as a delivery stream. The internal review found 51 issues, and 48 were closed before the external audit opened. The external audit by a CERT-In empanelled agency then took one round, and every finding was closed. Its three reports arrived on 19 June and the fixes were back on 22 June, three days later. Clearance followed on 30 June.

Controls the programme added

  • Ownership and role checks on every record route
  • Short-lived tokens with rotating refresh tokens, and account lockout
  • Rate limits on sensitive endpoints, and constant-time checks on one-time passwords
  • Secrets and keys held in a vault, with encryption at rest and TLS in transit
  • An immutable audit log of actors, actions and outcomes
  • A web application firewall in front of everything

The finding types and infrastructure detail stay off this page by design.

11 · Launch

Announced by the Minister, on 1 July 2026

The portal went live on 1 July 2026, launched publicly by the Minister for New and Renewable Energy. The week before, I confirmed the date as final, closed the open sprint tasks with the team, and ran the CTO review of the programme. All the integrations the scheme depends on (Aadhaar eSign and DSC signing, notifications and the document locker) are in place now.

20+applications in the pipeline
8certificates issued
8 / 3 / 4producers, ACV agencies, TC members
1 Julpublic launch, 2026

Verification of the remaining applications is in progress. After launch I ran an onboarding walkthrough for a second government agency covering the certification journey and the Producer, ACV, TC and Super Admin dashboards.

12 · Change control

A formal flow, and a three-day turnaround

After launch, the client asked for changes. Each one went through the same change process, and this is the one I run rather than skipping when a request is urgent.

  1. Requestfrom the client
  2. Impact analysismodules, rules, data
  3. Flow changeformally redrawn
  4. BRD updatedannexure
  5. Client approvalbefore any build
  6. Build and testpull request, review
  7. Releasesigned off
Change request 1What changed
Date-based exceptionsExceptions to the date-driven rules in the workflow
Payment-gateway exemptionAn exemption from the payment-gateway step
Super Admin credential creationA change to how credentials are created by the Super Admin
Dashboard viewA changed dashboard view

The workflow itself changed, so the change request went through formal flow change, impact assessment, a BRD update and client approval. It took about three days from the signed request to the change being ready. Claude helped with the impact analysis, the flow design, the exception rules, the code, the tests and the document updates, and I approved each artefact before it went to the client.

13 · AI across the lifecycle

Where Claude helped, and what stayed with a person

In use for deliveryPhase 2 AI: approved, in procurement

Claude supported the delivery work below. Phase 1 launched without any AI feature in the live platform.

StageWhat Claude producedWhat stayed a person's call
DiscoveryA searchable copy of the 24-page scheme; clause analyses on refunds, the implementing agency's role and ACV communicationWhich clause governs
RequirementsField lists per certificate and stakeholder; the 124-rule validation sheet; the 163-rule API mapping; SRS drafts; records of discussionWhat to accept, and the signed baseline
DesignPrototypes, three design-validation reports with 61 findings, and the swimlane diagramsThe final screens
BuildCode and specification help used daily by the developersEvery merge, by pull request
TestingUAT kits, test cases and bug trackersPass or fail, and sign-off
SecurityPattern reviews and rate-limit test scriptsRisk acceptance
DeploymentThe eight-role release checklist and runbook contentGo or no-go
OperationsFAQs, user guides and handholding decksTriage of what users report
ReportingMonthly progress reports, status decks and the CTO review deckWhat was mine and what was the team's
ProcurementThe Phase 2 request for quotation, six versions of itScope and approvals

Two prompts that did real work

"Go through the scheme, proposal, plan to implementation, fields shared and the discussion held with the client, and prepare a list of all information and fields that should be captured in the portal, certificate-wise, under separate stakeholders. We should not capture any information not relevant to the green hydrogen ecosystem."

"Read this PDF and prepare an OCR-compatible document. Do not remove any content. Keep the same order. No information loss. Do not invent any new information. An exact replica."

Where it was wrong

What went wrongHow it was caughtThe lesson
It cited clauses from the superseded 2024 scheme draftI supplied the final memorandum and had the citations re-checkedLoad the authoritative source first
It merged the team's work into my own reportI corrected it in FebruaryKeep a project manager's work separate from the team's
Architecture diagrams showed a different front-end framework from the one built; 12 discrepanciesI reviewed the diagrams against the stackReview every diagram against what exists
The guardrails

No personal data or credentials in a prompt. Every output reviewed by a person. The developer owns every merged change. Phase 1 contains no AI feature at all. The wider method is on the How I work.

14 · Phase 2

Phase 2: AI, with two rules attached

I wrote the scope for Phase 2. It covers six modules: document intelligence on submissions, emissions anomaly detection, a verification assistant for auditors, application summaries for the committee, compliance pattern intelligence, and process-risk prediction.

AI advises. A named officer approves every consequential action.

Every generated claim cites the document supporting it.

Neither guardrail is negotiable, because an incorrect certification decision carries financial and legal consequences. Acceptance rests on a golden dataset: cases previously answered manually become the reference the AI is measured against. Because the process itself was new, the evaluation method had to be designed as part of the programme. There was no benchmark to borrow.

Datasource recordsModelwhat produced itEvidencedocument citedValidationchecked vs rulesHuman decisiona named officerAuditable outcomelogged, repeatable
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An AI answer without provenance is not enough. In a regulated workflow the output must be traceable back to its source and forward to a human decision that someone answers for.
Where Phase 2 stands

The request for quotation is approved and procurement is in progress. The plan is six months from award, with two vendor resources working under me. The vendor builds only after procurement completes.

Expected outcomes

Targets, not results: fewer first-pass rejections (from roughly 30 to 40 percent towards under 5 percent), time saved per application, and measured accuracy against the golden dataset.

15 · What I carry forward

Sequencing is a product decision

Holding AI back a phase can be the thing that makes it adoptable. The question is not whether the model is good enough but whether the people accountable for the output can yet tell.

Where a process is genuinely new, the evaluation method is part of the deliverable. Designing the acceptance criteria alongside the thing being accepted is slower, and it is the only way the result means anything.

Change control is worth the three days. The change request that touched the workflow still went through impact analysis, a BRD update and client approval, and that is why the registry's record of what it does stayed true.

AI governance in a regulated workflowEvaluation designDigital registry architectureSecurity by designChange controlProduct sequencing